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Abstract — Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are a type of 
interruption (malicious and/or unintended) that restrict or 
completely deny services meant for legitimate users. One of 
the most relevant DoS attacks is Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attack which is a variant of DoS, but on a 
larger scale using previously compromised, malware 
infected computers known as “bots” or “zombies”. DDoS 
attack occurs by generating large amounts of traffic towards 
an intended victim.  
This paper focuses on analyzing a variant of DDoS attacks 
known as Network Time Protocol (NTP) Distributed 
Reflective Denial of Service (DRDoS) attack. The impact of 
the attack will be measured in the utilization of processor, 
memory, network and ping of most relevant devices. Further 
focus is on the host and network based layered “defense in-
depth” of NTP DRDoS attack mitigation techniques. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Shortly after Larry Roberts developed ARPANET from its 
inception in 1969, fundamental security issues were 
identified with that early version of the internet.  Since then, 
the scope of security has grown dramatically over several 
decades to include all components of information system. 
Although the internet and its use have changed dramatically 
since the original design, by default it is still an unsecure 
environment. This is due to the fact that security is a process 
not an absolute and on-going evolutionary changes in 
connectivity and emergence of new technologies such as 
Cloud, mobility & Internet of Things (IoT), introduce new 
cyber security challenges and hence hinder obtaining a 
perfect security. This means that the internet is exposed and 
vulnerable to malicious acts, environments and 
organizations. 
An example of such a malicious acts is, as mentioned 
above, a DDoS attack. Malicious parties and Cyber criminals 
are known to use this vector of attack for various reasons 
such as hacktivism, financial gain, government sponsored 
espionage or simply for recreation. Standard DDoS attack 
required previously infected computers called “bots” or 
“zombies”. A network of bots is called a “botnet” which can 
then be used to initiate a DDoS attack on an intended 
victim(s). 
Kasperky Labs’s “Global IT Security Risks Survey 2014” 
report shows that companies experience DDoS attacks 
across a wide range of industries around the globe [1]. It is 
not uncommon that big companies that generate revenue 
primarily from web services are often targeted by attackers. 
Neustar report states that DDoS attacks can cost such 
companies millions in mitigation and remediation [2].  
This paper focuses on NTP DRDoS attack due to its 
unique and easy execution. The primary point of difference 
between standard DDoS and NTP DRDoS is the fact that the 
execution of NTP DRDoS attack does not require any 
previously compromised computers. 
NTP DRDoS attack details are documented as Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures, CVE-2013-5211. This 
vulnerability uses the IP address in a populated monlist to 
send an amplified response. Monlist stores the internet port 
(IP) addresses of the last 600 clients that requested time 
synchronization. A method of extracting the monlist is with 
the use of the Nmap tool’s command nmap -sU -pU:123 -Pn 
-n --script=ntp-monlist “target IP here” [3]. Nmap, will 
send a MON_GETLIST or MON_GETLIST_1 command to 
the NTP server.  
Theoretically this vulnerability means a x 600 
amplification factor. In particular, the attacker forges or 
spoofs the IP address of the legitimate monlist request packet 
to the intended victims IP address as a destination IP address. 
This packet is then sent to the vulnerable NTP server which 
then responds to the destination address (the intended 
victim(s)’ IP) with an amplified response (reciprocally 
relative).  
In this paper, primary focus is on the analysis of 
performance effects and mitigations of NTP DRDoS attack 
on Cisco 2811 Router (R5), Windows Server 2012 R2 
(victim), Linux Ubuntu 14.04 LTS (Snort IPS and NTP 
Server).  
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section two 
discusses the previous related work of NTP DRDoS attack. 
Section three covers the testbed environment setup and 
hardware specification. Section four covers tools used in 
traffic generation and performance measurements. Section 
five covers the test results of the NTP DRDoS attack and 
mitigations, and the last sections include the conclusions and 
future areas of research.  
2. PRECEDING NTP DRDoS WORK 
A number of researchers have conducted analysis and 
comparison of NTP DRDoS Attack. In [4] and [5] the impact 
of a UDP flood attack such as TCP throughput, round-trip 
time, and CPU utilization on the Linux Ubuntu 13 and 
Windows Server 12 has been studied. Rossow et al. [6] state 
that exploitation of CVE-2013-5211 on a server with a 
monlist can cause a packet and bandwidth amplification 
RDoS or DRDoS. According to [7][6] and as illustrated in 
Eq. 1 (below) Bandwidth Amplification Factor (BAF) 
calculates “the bandwidth multiplier in terms of the number 
of UDP payload bytes that an amplifier sends to answer a 
request, compared to the number of UDP payload bytes of 
the request”.  
 
(1) 
Furthermore, as shown in Eq. 2, Rossow [7] explains, 
“Packet Amplification Factor (PAF) is the packet multiplier 
in terms of the number of IP packets that an amplifier sends 
to answer a request”. 
 
(2) 
With all calculations applied, theoretically, an NTP 
DRDoS attack exploiting the CVE-2013-5211 vulnerability 
can amplify the bandwidth of the attack by 600 times or 
556.9 on average according to Rossow. Packet amplification 
is smaller, averaging at 3.84 times.   
Overall, Rossow’s research concludes that NTP DRDoS 
attacks exploiting monlist vulnerability on average “amplify 
the request traffic by a factor of 556.9 – 4670.0”.  
On 10th February 2014, CloudFlare and one of their 
clients experienced one of the biggest NTP DRDoS attacks, 
peaking at almost 400 Gigabits per second (Gbps). The 
attacker(s) used 4,529 NTP servers running on 1,298 
different networks to generate approximately 400 Gbps of 
traffic [8]. Each of these servers sent on average 87 Mbps of 
traffic to the intended victim(s) on CloudFlare’s network. 
This paper used CloudFlare’s case study as a base example 
for the analysis conducted for this research.        
3. TESTBED ENVIRONMENT 
There has been no research done on the testing 
performance effects on NTP DRDoS on Cisco 2811 Router, 
Linux Ubuntu 14.04 LTS and Windows Server 2012 R2. The 
network implemented for testbed environment is depicted in 
Fig. 1. The testbed hardware setup remained constant for all 
tests conducted. All of the routers were Cisco 2811, three 
NTP Servers and the IDS/IPS had Ubuntu 14.04 LTS 
installed, Attacker PC used Kali Linux 1.0.8 and the victim 
was Windows Server 2012 R2. Test Net was used to launch 
a test and modify preliminary attacks, which were then 
verified by replication of the attacks on the monitored victim 
network. 
 
Due to each widely used Cisco 2811 Router having only 
two 100Mbps Wide Area Network (WAN) ports and some 
of the router utilized one of the WAN ports for Router-on-a-
stick configuration, an unmanaged switch was required for 
connectivity. Snort was implemented in inline configuration 
as an IDS/IPS mitigation. To ensure maximum utilization of 
Network, Interface Cards (NIC) Cat5e cabling was 
implemented.  
The hardware for the victim comprised of Quad Intel® 
Core™ i7 operating at 3600 Megahertz (MHz) with 16.00 
Gigabyte (GB) DDR3 Random Access Memory (RAM) 
operating at 1333 MHz with Windows Server 2012 R2 
installed. Snort IDS/IPS consisted of identical hardware 
configuration as the victim except for the 8.00 GB RAM and 
an additional NIC. IOS 12.4 was running on the Cisco 2811 
Router.  
Various services were implemented in both Test Net and 
victim network in order to simulate a real-world environment. 
Traffic generating, measuring and traffic analysis tools were 
also implemented. Combined tools and services provided an 
appropriate environment for reporting on attack performance 
and on client/victim effects.  
4. TRAFFIC GENERATION AND MEASUREMENT 
TOOLS 
PRTG Network Monitor [9] was the primary tool used to 
create the baselines and measure the performance effects of 
NTP DRDoS attacks. PRTG is capable of measuring every 
aspect of hosts’ performance by utilizing Simple Network 
Management Protocol (SNMP), Windows Management 
Instrumentation (WMI) and Remote Procedure Call (RPC). 
Snort [10] was an alternative open source network 
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), used also throughout this 
research to measure the performance effects of NTP DRDoS 
and correlate the result with those collected by PRTG 
Network Monitor. 
Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) [11] is a simple to use, 
network stress testing and denial of service application 
utilized in some tests conducted. It utilizes UDP and TCP 
protocols to generate traffic and flood the intended victim’s 
network. 
Fig. 1: Testbed network diagram 
Hping [12] is a tool similar to LOIC as it is a traffic 
generator/analyzer and packet assembler. The primary 
purpose of Hping was to be a secondary DDoS attack vector. 
Bittwist [13] is also a packet generator with an additional 
ability to forge (spoof) IP addresses. Bittwist was the 
primary tool used to generate traffic with a forged (spoofed) 
victim’s IP address, essentially conducting NTP DRDoS. 
However, during peak of attack, Bittwist, Hping, and LOIS 
were used simultaneously utilizing routers’ interfaces.  
Various tools and services such as Open Office Suite, 
FileZilla, Apache Web Server, LAN Messenger and VoIP 
were installed across all networks in order to generate 
network noise and utilization in order to simulate a “real 
world” environment. Baselines were created by monitoring 
the network over 96 hours (4 days) using PRTG Network 
Monitor. To ensure validity of the data, NTP DRDoS attack 
was also conducted for 96 hours.  
5. TEST RESULTS 
All the tests conducted were validated and measured in 
compassion to the two created baselines, without 
implemented security and with implemented security. Tests 
results presented were the results found to be relevant and 
results that indicated any type of measureable DoS effects of 
conducted NTP DRDoS attacks. The data in the graphs has 
been rounded to the nearest numerical value to represent the 
graphed data reported/viewed in PRTG Network Monitor. 
The exact recorded data is reported in Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Fig 
8. 
Furthermore, this section analyzes primary implemented 
mitigations such as ntp.conf file configuration, Reflexive 
Access Control Lists (RACL), Committed Access Rate 
Limiting (CAR), and an inline IPS (Snort). During the tests, 
anomalies were detected in some baseline reports. 
Anomalies are highlighted in red and addressed in the 
footnote1.  
  
 
  
 
 
                                                          
1 There is no indication of why this happened but it wasn’t because of the 
NTP DRDoS as it was not being conducted at the time of anomaly 
occurrence. 
 
 
5.1 Impact of NTP DRDoS 
Fig. 2 shows that the victim equipped with Intel Haswell 
i7 CPU does not seem to be affected by the amount of traffic 
requiring processing after incoming from the computer’s 
NIC, even with the Baseline 1 settings with no NTP DRDoS 
mitigations implemented. Results also show that the overall 
average CPU utilization of the victim is the same across both 
baselines and while experiencing DRDoS. The graph shows 
the victim’s CPU minimum at 0.9% and maximum at 12.12% 
with average varying between 1% and 2%. 
Fig. 3 presents the impact of a NTP DRDoS attack on the 
victim’s network utilization. It shows that the victim’s 
network utilization is primarily affected during NTP DRDoS 
attack with no security implemented. All of the traffic 
intended for the victim is being passed on by R5 and is 
reaching its destination. This is mainly due to the fact that 
during Baseline 1 tests there were no NTP DRDoS security 
measures implemented. Minimum observed Kbps affecting 
the victim were recorded at 44Kbps under Baseline 1 - no 
security while maximum was recorded at 96,090Kbps during 
Baseline 1 NTP DRDoS attack (no security). The graph 
above also shows that the implemented mitigations are 
effective as the victim shows minimal network activity under 
NTP DRDoS attack with security implemented (Baseline 2 
– Attack security) as the total average traffic incoming to 
victim is 118Kbps. 
Fig. 4 below shows the average CPU load of R5 which is 
most affected by the attack as it has to route and process all 
of the incoming packets. Regarding Baseline 1, before the 
attack R5’s CPU averaged at 2% while during the attack it 
had a CPU average usage of 97% with a maximum CPU 
usage of 99% which is 39% above Cisco’s recommended 
CPU utilization of 60%. Baseline 2 Attack data shows R5’s 
CPU maximum utilization of 28%2 increasing to 99% during 
the attack with all implemented NTP DRDoS mitigations. 
The most significant increase in R5’s CPU utilization is seen 
in the “average” measurement as it increased from 3% to 
99%.  
2 Anomaly 
Fig. 3: Victim network utilization 
Fig. 2: Victim CPU load average % 
Comparing this data to Baseline 1 Attack we are able to 
determine that the security implementations have had a slight 
impact on the R5’s CPU utilization thus potentially 
increasing the impact of the denial of service by reducing 
available CPU resources. 
Fig. 5 shows R5’s Kbits per second average (rounded). 
R5’s incoming traffic rate of average maximum Kbits per 
second increased from 1,769Kbps to 97,417Kbps. R5’s 
average total traffic before the attack was 21Kbps, while 
during the NTP DRDoS attack it averaged at 94,649Kbps.   
As highlighted in red, there was an anomaly that occurred 
during Baseline 2 with security, where a maximum of 
67,7382 Kbps was measured. Exclusive of this anomaly, 
R5’s data shows an average of 31Kbps for Baseline 2 with 
security. 
 
 
 
 
 
The following figures detail the overall observations 
across baseline 1 and 2 prior and during a NTP DRDoS 
attack including Ping results to R5. Fig. 8 shows the results 
of the Victim pinging R5. The results clearly show that the 
ping times and packet loss increased significantly during 
NTP DRDoS attack with implemented security. R5 ping 
time under Baseline 1 (no security) increased from 0msec to 
144msec while under attack. R5 ping time under Baseline 2 
(with security) increased from 1msec to 324msec while 
under attack, as experiencing a 4% packet loss. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. MITIGATIONS 
Mitigations are mainly implemented on the edge router or 
the IPS of the vulnerable network, while only a few are on 
the victim its self. Security settings that were successfully 
implemented are depicted below. On the R5 router, ACL and 
RACL, CAR was implemented. Fig. 9 confirms the validity 
of ACL and RACL as mitigations techniques on R5, showing 
network traffic dropping from 76.4Mbps to 32 Kbps.  
ACLs, in general, are rules allowing or denying packets 
coming into or going out of a router’s interface. RACL, on 
the other hand, is a type of ACL that allows filtering IP 
packets based on upper-layer session information, while 
CAR allows limited traffic entering or leaving an interface. 
Fig. 10 was captured during a NTP DRDoS, proving that 
the implementation of RACL works correctly by blocking 
the spoofed IP addresses while allowing legitimate NTP 
packets into the network. 
Fig. 11 shows the validity of CAR as the victim bandwidth 
utilization while under NTP DRDoS drops from 95Mbps to 
5.3Mbps as per the following router command: rate-limit 
input access-group 101 16000 32000 64000 conform-action 
transmit exceed-action drop 
Fig. 4: R5 CPU load average percentage 
Fig. 5: R5 Kbits p/s Average Percentage 
Fig. 6: R5 & victim CPU utilization 
Fig. 7: R5 & victim Kbps 
Fig. 8: Victim to R5 Ping Times & Packet Loss 
  
 
 
 
 
To test the functionality of our custom created rule NTP 
DRDoS attack was conducted with Snort inline IPS as the 
only NTP DRDoS mitigation (router security was removed). 
A custom made rule was implemented:  
drop udp $EXTERNAL_NET 123 -> $HOME_NET any 
(msg:”NTP AMP Request”;  content:”|d7 00 03 2a|”; 
dsize:>90; classtype: denial-of-service; 
reference:cve:2013-5211; sid:40000001; rev:1;) 
The format of the custom rule is drop all UDP packets 
from external networks on port 123 towards internal network 
on any port, display the message “NTP AMP Request”, 
containing d7 00 03 2a hexadecimal, with a payload larger 
than 90 bytes. Reference sid and revision are general Snort 
rule requirements. 
Fig. 12 shows the CPU, memory and bandwidth effects of 
running Snort with the custom rule above. During the attack, 
all NTP amplified packets matching the rule above are seen 
being dropped by Snort/IPS as there is no outgoing traffic 
(towards the internal network). 
 Fig. 13 shows Snort custom rule at work. It is worth noting 
that Snort as in line IPS functions best when implemented as 
in-depth layered defence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9: ACL and RACL Mitigations Activated 
Fig. 10: Legitimate NTP Packets being received 
CAR Activated 
Fig. 11: Activated CAR Affect 
Fig. 12: Custom Snort Rule Effectiveness 
Figure 13: Snort cli Dropping NTP Amplified Packets 
ACL and RACL Activated 
  
The final mitigation implemented was to not remove or 
manually add (if applicable) a noquery parameter in the 
restrict line in the ntp.conf file on vulnerable NTP servers.  
Once ntp.conf file has the noquery parameter in the restrict 
line, there can be no NTP DRDoS (CVE-2013-5211) 
vulnerability can be used to cause a Denial of Service. It is 
the ultimate and the easiest fix to the CVE-2013-5211 
vulnerability that should be implemented by all affected NTP 
server’ administrators.  
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper concludes that R5 router is the first line of 
defence as well as being the most important in defending 
against an NTP DRDoS attack. Working with the IPS it 
provides an acceptable level of NTP DRDoS protection 
towards an internal LAN. However, this is not to be 
considered as sufficient protection. To fully prevent and/or 
stop NTP DRDoS attacks, mitigations need to be 
implemented on the NTP server and its router side as well. 
Only then will the NTP DRDoS be mitigated. 
Final observations are that the R5 router is most affected 
by the attack. Regarding Baseline 1 (no security), before the 
attack R5’s CPU averaged at 2%, while during the attack it 
had a CPU usage average of 97% with a maximum CPU 
usage of 99%. 
Baseline 2 Attack (with security) data shows R5’s CPU 
maximum utilization of 3% (28% inclusive of the anomaly) 
increasing to 99% during the attack with all implemented 
NTP DRDoS mitigations. The most significant increase in 
R5’s CPU utilization is seen in the “average” measurement 
as it increased from 3% to 99%. 
R5’s incoming traffic rate under Baseline 1 (no security) 
of maximum Kbits per second average increased from 
1,769Kbps to 97,417Kbps. R5’s average total traffic before 
the attack was 21Kbps, while during the NTP DRDoS attack 
it averaged at 94,649Kbps.   
There was an anomaly that occurred during Baseline 2 
(with security) where a maximum of 67,738 Kbps was 
measured. Exclusive of this anomaly, R5’s data shows traffic 
average of 31Kbps for Baseline 2 (with security). 
R5 ping time under Baseline 1 (no security) increases from 
0msec to 144msec while under attack. R5 ping time under 
Baseline 2 (with security), increases from 1msec to 324msec 
while under attack as experiencing a 4% packet loss. 
The victim’s CPU minimum was at 0.9% and maximum 
at 12.1 % with average varying between 1% and 2% with an 
anomaly spiking at 12.1%. 
Minimum observed network bandwidth Kbps affecting 
the victim were recorded at 44Kbps under Baseline 1 (no 
security), while maximum was recorded at 96,090Kbps 
while under NTP DRDoS attack (Baseline 1 - no security). 
With mitigations implemented, minimal network activity 
was observed under NTP DRDoS attack (Baseline 2 – with 
security) as the total average traffic incoming to victim was 
recorded at 118Kbps. 
8. FUTURE AREAS OF RESEARCH 
    Other NTP vulnerabilities and their appropriate 
mitigations could also be an area of further research. NTP 
servers that were used in this research contained 4 more NTP 
vulnerabilities that were not closely looked at or thoroughly 
researched due to time constraints. Simple Service 
Discovery Protocol (SSDP) and Domain Name Service 
(DNS) amplification are two other DDoS attack vectors that 
require in-depth analysis and research which could 
potentially be future areas of research.  
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